主题：Dealer Funding and Market Liquidity（经销商资金与市场流动性）
主讲人：Max Bruche, 柏林洪堡大学金融学教授
日期：2019年2月27（周三）
时间：上午10:00 - 11:30
地点：德州扑克大小
金融德州扑克大小
4号楼102教室
语言：英文
摘要：
We consider a model in which dealers need to raise external financing to provide liquidity, and also exert unobservable effort to improve the chance of closing a position at a profit. This moral hazard problem affects how and how much external finance dealers can raise. Therefore, it limits intermediation volume, soften competition between dealers, and widens bid-ask spreads. When dealers suffer losses, the problem becomes worse. Effects are stronger for riskier assets. Endogenous correlation and contagion in liquidity arise between otherwise unrelated assets. As the optimal financing arrangement involves debt, regulations that limits the leverage of bank-affiliated dealers can have adverse effects on market liquidity.
主讲人简介:
Max Bruche is Professor of Finance at Humboldt University Berlin. He received his PhD in Finance from the London School of Economics and holds a BA in Politics, Philosophy and Economics and MPhil in Economics, both from Oxford University. He has previously worked at the Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI) in Madrid, Cass Business School in London, and has held visiting positions at Lehman Brothers, the European Central Bank, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Professor Bruche's research interests include corporate debt markets, corporate finance, and financial intermediation.
