主题：The Redistributive Effects of Bank Capital Regulation（银行资本监管再分配效应）
主讲人：Robert S. Marquez，加利福尼亚大学戴维斯分校金融学教授
日期：2017年11月1日（周三）
时间：上午10:00-11:30
地点：德州扑克大小
金融德州扑克大小
4号楼101教室
语言：英文
摘要：
We build a general equilibrium model of
banks' optimal capital structure, where investors are reluctant to invest in financial
products other than deposits, and where bankruptcy is costly. We first show
that banks raise both deposits and equity, and that investors are willing to
hold equity only if adequately compensated. We then introduce (binding) capital
requirements and show that: (i) it distorts investment away from productive
projects toward storage; or (ii) it increases the cost of raising capital for
banks, with the bulk of this cost accruing to depositors. These results hold
also when we extend the model to incorporate various rationales justifying
capital regulation.
主讲人简介:
Robert
Marquez received a PhD in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and an A.B. in Economics from the University of California, Berkeley. He is a Professor in the Graduate School of
Management at the University of California, Davis. Prior to this, Marquez was
an Associate Professor of Finance at the School of Management of Boston
University, and was the Craig and Rhonda Cerny Associate Professor of Finance
at Arizona State University. He has held various visiting positions at the FDIC
and the U.S. Federal Reserve system
Marquez’s
research focuses on the issue of competition among financial institutions and
its implications for the allocation of credit. Specifically, he is interested in analyzing how information problems for
financial intermediaries interact with the way in which banks compete. He has used this general framework to analyze
issues of entry into banking markets, the acquisition of information about
borrowers, the use of information technology, and changes in the structure of
banking markets. He has also done work
studying regulation in banking when the economies in which the banks operate
are financially integrated. More recently, Marquez’s work has focused on the
design of financial contracts, and on theoretical issues within private equity
markets and mergers and acquisitions.
