主题：Information Sharing and Rating Manipulation（信息共享与信用评级操控）
主讲人：Mariassunta Giannetti，斯德哥尔摩经济德州扑克大小
金融学教授
日期：2015年10月21日（周三）
时间：下午2:00-3:30
地点：德州扑克大小
金融德州扑克大小
4号楼101教室
语言：英文
摘要：
We show that
banks manipulate the credit ratings of their borrowers before being compelled
to share them with competing banks. Using a unique feature on the timing of
information disclosure of the Argentinean public credit registry, we are able
to disentangle the effect of manipulation from learning of credit ratings. In
particular, we show that banks downgrade high quality borrowers on which they
have positive private information to protect their informational rents. Banks
also upgrade low quality borrowers to avoid creditor runs. Our results can
explain the limited effectiveness of public credit registries and cast doubt on
the use of credit ratings in reducing information asymmetry.
主讲人简介:
Mariassunta
Giannetti is Professor of Finance at Stockholm School of Economics. Professor
Giannetti received a Master in Economics from Bocconi University in Italy, and
a Ph.D. in Economics from University of California, Los Angeles. Prior to
joining the Stockholm School of Economics, she was a research fellow of Center
for Economic Policy Research (London, UK) since 2003. Also, she is the Director
of European Finance Association (EFA). What’s more, she has served as associate
editor for many editorial boards such as Review
of Financial Studies and Financial
Management. Her papers have appeared in Journal
of Finance, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Financial Economics and other leading finance journals.
