主题：Executive Gatekeepers: Useful and Divertible Governance （高管守门员：有用与分心的监管）
主讲人：王炜，加拿大皇后商德州扑克大小
副教授
日期：2014年10月22日（周三）
时间：下午1:30-3:00
地点：德州扑克大小
金融德州扑克大小
4号楼101教室
语言：英文
摘要：
We study the effectiveness of internal gatekeepers and then ask whether equity incentives divert the attention of corporate lawyers from gatekeeping. We find that executive gatekeepers reduce compliance failures (AAERS and insider trading profits) to negligible levels and decrease securities fraud and uncaught accounting fraud by 43% and 9% respectively. A general counsel fixed effect explains 7% variation in AAERs, and 6% in class action suits, over and above firm, year, and CEO fixed effects. Then, using the assumption that gatekeepers hired from law firms are initially less responsive to incentive pay as compared to those hired from other corporations for identification, we find that equity incentives given to gatekeepers unwind some governance improvements. A one standard deviation increase in gatekeeper's compensation delta unwinds 82% of the prevention of securities fraud. Gatekeepers do not get diverted, however, from frauds associated with regulatory compliance. We conclude with an alternative interpretation of our design that these gatekeepers-in -residence may be hired as value-creators, but totems of governance.
主讲人简介:
Wei Wang is an Associate Professor of Finance at Queen's School of Business. He received his Ph.D. in Finance from London Business School in 2005. Dr. Wang's research interests are in bankruptcy restructuring, distressed investing, corporate governance, activist investors, and capital structure. His research has been published in the Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Financial Management, and the Journal of Fixed Income, and featured in various media including the Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones Newswires, South China Morning Post, The Globe and Mail, National Post, and Business Week.
