主题：Corporate Tax Havens and Transparency（企业避税港及透明度）
主讲人：Stefan Zeume，密歇根大学罗斯商德州扑克大小
金融学助理教授
日期：2016年3月30日（周三）
时间：下午2:30-4:00
地点：德州扑克大小
金融德州扑克大小
4号楼101教室
语言：英文
摘要：
In hand-collected
subsidiary data on 17,331 publicly listed firms from 52 countries, we identify
expropriation- related motives for establishing tax haven subsidiaries. First,
Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) increase average shareholder value
of affected firms by 2.5 percent. Second, the effect is stronger for firms
with more complex tax haven structures. Third, some firms respond to TIEAs by haven hopping, i.e., they move
subsidiaries from affected to non-affected tax havens. Fourth, the shareholder
effect is larger for firms with lower institutional ownership. This suggests
that (i) tax havens are used for expropriation activities that go beyond pure
tax saving activities and (ii) increased transparency is applauded by
non-controlling shareholders.
主讲人简介:
Stefan Zeume
holds the assistant professor in Finance at Ross School of Business, University
of Michigan. He earned his doctoral degree in Finance from INSEAD (France)
in 2014. Dr. Zeume’s research interests include corporate finance,
corporate governance, corruption,
regulation and taxes.
