主题： External Governance and Debt Structure（外部治理与债务结构）
主讲人： Sreedhar T. Bharath，亚利桑那州立大学凯瑞商德州扑克大小
金融学教授
日期：2016年4月6日（周三）
时间：下午2:30-4:00
地点：德州扑克大小
金融德州扑克大小
4号楼101教室
语言：英文
摘要：
This paper examines
how external governance pressure provided by both the product market and the
market for corporate control affects the type of debt that firms issue. Consistent
with a governance substitution effect, we find that (i) an exogenous increase
in governance pressure from the product market has a significant negative
impact on the use of bank financing over public debt issuance, and (ii) an
exogenous decrease in governance pressure from the takeover market has a significant
positive impact on the use of bank financing. Tests using changes in the
strictness of loan covenants provides corroborative evidence. Also consistent
with bank “specialness” in providing governance, w. We interpret these findings
as consistent with the notion that firms endogenously substitute among
alternative governance mechanisms in devising a governance structure that
allows external capital to be raised at the lowest possible cost and that
demand for creditor governance depends on the relative strength of alternative external
governance mechanisms.
主讲人简介:
Sreedhar T. Bharath holds the Professor
of Finance and Dean’s Council of 100
Distinguished Scholar at W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. Prior to joining academics,
he worked for University of Michigan and State Bank of India Capital Markets. He
earned his doctoral degree in Finance from New York Stern School of Business in
2003. Professor Bharath’s research interests include Credit Risk, Bank
Relationships and Corporate Finance. He has articles published in the Journal of Financial Economics, Review of
Financial Studies, and Journal of
Banking and Finance, among others.
